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NOTE
TEARING DOWN THE HOUSE: WEAKENING THE
FOUNDATION OF DIVORCE MEDIATION BRICK BY BRICK"
Mediation is an attractive alternative to traditional litigation. In the last
decade the use of mediation in family law has increased substantially. Medi-
ation is particularly suited to family disputes when the parties voluntarily
choose to use the process because it can help the parties resolve disputes
and foster long-term relationships. Not all parties, however, are given a
choice between mediation and more traditional adversarial justice. Current-
ly, state legislation ranges from permitting mediation to mandating media-
tion. Manditory mediation raises the issue of due process violations, espe-
cially in situations involving spousal abuse.
This Note analyzes the use of mediation in domestic relations cases and
specifically looks at the use of manditory mediation in situations involving
abuse. The author suggests that when mediation is voluntary it can be a
useful tool in resolving domestic disputes, including divorce and child custo-
dy issues. When mediation is mandated, however, it violates the
participants' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment--especially in situations where one of the parties has been abused by
the other. The author suggests that mediation should remain voluntary, that
statutes should provide for mediation only when parties are willing to par-
ticipate, and that mediators should screen for abuse and discontinue the
mediation process if abuse is discovered.
INTRODUCrION
Participants in the American legal system have options when deciding
how to resolve conflicts. One option is to pursue conflict resolution in the
traditional manner, through litigation. The adversarial system, however, is
plagued with problems, including backlogged dockets from growing case-
loads, cost-conscious initiatives, and reduced time for each case.1 These
The author is a certified mediator in Virginia.
1 See generally Andre G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Bat-
tered Women, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 272, 272 (1992) (discussing the problems of
mandatory mediation in divorce); Douglas D. Knowlton & Tara Lea Muhlhauser, Medi-
ation in the Presence of Domestic Violence: Is it the Light at the End of the Tunnel or
is It a Train on the Track?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 255, 255-58 (1994) (discussing the bene-
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problems make alternatives to traditional litigation attractive to parties who
wish to resolve their disputes in a more timely and cost-effective fashion.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR)2 has become an attractive alterna-
tive to litigation and is often viewed as a means of alleviating some of the
burdens of the traditional approach to resolving disputes.3 The most attrac-
tive attribute of ADR is that it can resolve disputes more quickly than litiga-
tion at a lower cost to the participants. For these reasons in particular, me-
diation has permeated many areas of civil and criminal law.
Mediation is a "voluntary dispute resolution process which involves: [a]
third-party neutral who has no stake in the outcome."4 Both courts and pri-
vate parties have turned to mediation for effective dispute resolution. The
National Center for State Courts noted that over 200 court-connected media-
tion programs exist in the United States,5 with states' use of mediation on
the rise.6 In civil cases, the federal government and the states employ medi-
ation in the following types of disputes: personal injury, construction, labor,
commercial, environmental, complex multi-party anti-trust actions, and
RICO claims.7 Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia utilize medi-
ation in custody and visitation disputes.8 Moreover, "[tihirty-three states
have statutes or court rules that mandate mediation in contested custody and
visi2tation cases." 9
In the last decade, the use of mediation in the area of family law has
risen,'0 especially as an effort to resolve divorce, custody, and visitation
disputes. Mediation is particularly suited to families because parties volun-
tarily work to resolve disputes and foster long-term relationships in the
mediation process. Despite mediation's beneficial goals, however, "its use in
domestic abuse cases has generated considerable discussion among victim
fits of mediation as "an alternative to traditional divorce proceedings").
2 ADR includes mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and a variety of processes that
combine these dispute resolution methods. See MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S. G.
HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 8-9 (1996).
' See BETTE J. ROTH' ET AL., THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE
GUIDE § 23:1 (1996) [hereinafter ADR PRACTICE GUIDE].
4 MAINE COURT MEDIATION SERVICE, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, MEDIATION IN
CASES OF DOMESTIC ABUSE: HELPFUL OPTION OR UNACCEPTABLE RISK? 5 (1992)
[hereinafter MEDIATION IN CASES OF DOMESTIC ABUSE].
' See Peter Salem & Ann L. Milne, Making Mediation Work in a Domestic Vio-
lence Case, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 34, 34 (1995).
6 See Dan Trigoboff, More States Adopting Divorce Mediation, A.B.A. J., Mar.
1995, at 49.
7 See ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 3, § 23:1, at 2.
8 Salem & Milne, supra note 5, at 34.
9 Id.
"0 See Alison Gerenser & Megan Kelly, Family Mediation: An Alternative to Liti-
gation, 68 FLA. B.J. 49, 49 (Nov. 1994).
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advocates, mediators, lawyers, judges, and others who work in the domestic
relations, victim advocacy, and law-related fields.""
Mediation may not be suited for divorce proceedings involving domestic
violence or abuse. The basic elements of mediation are voluntary partici-
pation, roughly equal bargaining power, mediator neutrality, a non-binding
outcome, and confidentiality. 2 Although a principle tenet of mediation is
voluntariness, several states have implemented mandatory mediation through
the courts or by statute.'
3
Improper implementation of the process can undermine the basic ele-
ments of mediation. First, voluntary participation becomes involuntary when
mandated by a court or by statute. 4 Second, the abused is not on equal
footing with the abuser, so skewed bargaining power can affect the resolu-
tion of the dispute.'5 Third, if the mediator remains neutral, she accepts and
condones the abuser's acts, which can disempower the abused and result in
a coerced, rather than a bargained-for, resolution. 6 Fourth, mandatory me-
diation often requires that the parties resolve the dispute, whereas non-bind-
ing mediation does not require a resolution.17 Fifth, some jurisdictions re-
quire mediators to report situations of abuse to protect the abused; however,
if the jurisdiction does not require mediators to report abuse, mediation stan-
dards may not permit the mediator to breach his pledge of confidentiality."8
Mediation advocates assert that mediation in the domestic violence con-
text is "potentially unsafe and inherently unfair."' 9 Victims argue that the
"dynamics endemic to an abusive relationship preclude the possibility of
collaborative decision making, even with a skilled mediator."'
This Note explores whether mandatory mediation and mediation in situa-
tions of abuse violate a participant's due process rights. Part I lays the foun-
dation of mediation, including the definition, requirements, and goals of
mediation. It discusses the use of mediation in particular areas, compares the
adversarial and mediation processes, and weighs the advantages of media-
tion over other forms of ADR as well as the adversarial system. Part II
discusses what family law mediation entails, analyzes current statutes that
'1 Salem & Milne, supra note 5, at 34.
12 See Gagnon, supra note 1, at 274.
13 See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
14 See discussion infra Part II.B.
" See Salem & Milne, supra note 5, at 36; see also Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra
note 1, at 263.
16 See Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 1, at 265-68; see also Gagnon, supra
note 1, at 276.
11 See discussion infra Part II.B.
18 See John Murphy, Mediation and the Duty to Disclose, in CONFIDENTIALITY IN
MEDIATION: A PRACTIONER'S GUIDE 87, 87-90 (American Bar Ass'n ed., 1985).
"9 Salem & Milne, supra note 5, at 34.
Id. at 36.
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provide for some form of mediation, and addresses mediation in the context
of divorce proceedings, with a focus on situations both of non-abuse and
abuse. Part III concludes that in situations of abuse, mandatory mediation
violates a participant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
but voluntary mediation does not. Part IV recommends (1) that mediation
remain voluntary because mandating it violates the foundational principles
of mediation, (2) that statutes provide for mediation if parties are willing to
participate, and (3) that programs that screen for abuse are necessary to
prevent mediation from occurring and/or continuing in situations of abuse.
I.
A. Foundation of Mediation
Sources define mediation in many ways. It is described as "a method of
settlement negotiation in which the parties to a dispute meet with an impar-
tial third party, the mediator, and attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory
resolution of their dispute,"'" a "process for conflict resolution or conflict
management; an alternative to violence, self-help, or litigation, it is different
from the processes of counseling, negotiation, and arbitration," 22 and "a
voluntary dispute resolution process which involves: [a] third-party neutral
who has no stake in the outcome [and] [d]isputants who jointly search for
solutions that are creative and practical, that address the separate concerns
and interests of the parties, and that are based on objective criteria."'23
Irrespective of its many definitions, mediation fulfills many goals and
objectives, including the following:
(1) creating win-win situations,'
(2) empowering the parties,'
(3) "reconcil[ing] the interests of the parties,"'26
(4) "creat[ing] a better atmosphere for further negotiation and develop-
ing options for mutual gain,"27
(5) fostering relationships,'
21 ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 3, § 23:3, at 4.
2 Alison Taylor, A General Theory of Divorce Mediation, in DIVORCE MEDIATION
61, 61 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988).
23 MEDIATION IN CASES OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, supra note 4, at 5.
24 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 62.
25 See id. at 61.
26 ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 3, § 23:9, at 7.
27 Id. § 23:9.
See Taylor, supra note 22, at 62.
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(6) being "more cost-effective than traditional litigation,"29
(7) "reduc[ing] the anxiety and other negative effects of conflict by
helping the participants reach consensual resolution,"'
(8) "reduc[ing], resolv[ing] and manag[ing] conflicts,"3
(9) "mak[ing] appropriate decisions,"32
(10) "prepar[ing] participants to accept the consequences of their deci-
sions,"33
(11) "produc[ing] an agreement or plan that the participants can accept,
and with which they will comply,"' and
(12) "focus[ing] on the specifics of how participants will reduce and
resolve the conflict, rather than what causal factors led to the con-
flict., ,3
5
These goals and objectives derive from the general characteristics of
mediation.36 To preserve the fundamental characteristics of mediation that
achieve the above goals, mediation must be an entirely voluntary and non-
binding process, one which requires "rough parity in bargaining power be-
tween the parties to be successful."37 Additionally, "[iut is a finite process
that produces specific outcomes, using the 'values, norms, and principles of
the participants' rather than those of the neutral third-party mediator."'
Mediation participants include the two parties in dispute and a mediator,39
29 Id. § 24:5.
30 Taylor, supra note 22, at 61.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See generally ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 3, §§ 23:4-10 (discussing the
general characteristics of the mediation process).
31 Charles A. Bethel & Linda R. Singer, Mediation: A New Remedy for Cases of
Domestic Violence, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 363, 370
(Howard Davison et al. eds., 1982).
38 Taylor, supra note 22, at 61.
39 See ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 3, §§ 26:11-12. The Task Force on Media-
tion set the following guidelines for mediators:
Standard I: "The mediator has a auty to define and describe the processes of media-;
tion and its cost before the parties reach an agreement to mediate." TASK
FORCE ON MEDIATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIVORCE AND
FAMILY MEDIATION, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 1 (1984).
Standard II: "The mediator shall not voluntarily disclose information obtained through
the mediation process without the prior consent of both participants." Id.
at 2.
Standard III: "The mediator has a duty to be impartial." Id. at 3.
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and possibly include attorneys and court personnel. In the mediation pro-
cess, mediators have no power to render decisions. The mediation format
includes joint meetings (fact exchanges) and private sessions (caucuses); and
the process is confidential with regard to the proceedings."
B. Comparison of Adversarial and Mediation Processes
In the case of a divorce, the ultimate goal of the adversarial system and
mediation are identical: to "present the court with a settlement
agreement."4 In addition, the discovery stage in mediation, like the ad-
versarial system, requires full disclosure, and mediators use similar methods
"to ensure the truth of the information relied upon to reach settlement. Both
systems make liberal use of experts. All the issues essential to a complete
agreement that are normally raised by attorneys must also be raised by me-
diators."42
Why, then, is mediation more desirable than adversarial negotiations,
which are used by the vast majority of the divorcing public? The answer lies
in the different questions each process asks its participants, as well as in the
way the processes define the issues involved. 3 In the adversarial system, a
set of procedures governs the outcome, with the attorney acting as the inter-
preter of what to expect in court." In contrast to the adversarial process,
which requires that parties submit to what courts or legislators deem equita-
Standard IV: "The mediator has a duty to assure that the mediation participants make
decisions based upon sufficient information and knowledge." Id. at 4.
Standard V: "The mediator has a duty to suspend or terminate mediation whenever
continuation of the process would harm one or more of the participants."
Id. at 5.
Standard VI: "The mediator has a continuing duty to advise each of the mediation par-
ticipants to obtain legal review prior to reaching any agreement." Id.
o Two models describe the phases of mediation. The first model includes three
phases: information gathering, probing or playing devil's advocate, and strategizing and
negotiating. See ADR PRACrICE GUIDE, supra note 3, § 23:15. The second model in-
volves eight phases: "(1) introduction and orientation; (2) fact-finding and disclosure;
(3) isolation and definition of issues; (4) exploration and negotiation of alternatives; (5)
compromise and accommodation; (6) reaching tentative agreement; (7) review and pro-
cessing settlement; [and] (8) finalization and implementation." Ann Milne & Jay
Folberg, The Theory and Practice of Divorce Mediation: An Overview, in DIVORCE
MEDIATION 3, 8-9 (Jay Folgberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988).
"' See Stephen K. Erickson, The Legal Dimension of Divorce Mediation, in DIVORCE
MEDIATION, supra note 40, at 106.
42 Id.
11 See id.
"" See id.'
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ble, the mediation process encourages parties to decide what is fair as a
means of creating their own law of fairness.45
Although both processes devise agreements, they arrive at those agree-
ments differently. Mediators facilitate an agreement that the parties negotiate
themselves; attorneys in the adversarial process "advise and negotiate a
settlement on behalf of their clients., 4' The framing of issues is different
between the two processes. In the adversarial process, "attorneys define the
most common divorce issues in a way that reflects the basic assumptions
inherent in the adversarial court process, in terms of competitive, win-lose
outcomes. In contrast, mediators define divorce issues in mutual, cooperative
terms that require a different effort to answer the questions.,
47
Mediation has several advantages over other forms of ADR and the
adversarial system. Voluntary mediation is non-binding and promotes win-
win situations by fostering long-term relationships.4 Additionally, media-
tion is concerned more with the present and future than with the past.49
II.
A. What Family Law Mediation Encompasses
Mediation within the familial setting differs from other forms of media-
tion in that it involves conflict between individuals in close physical and
emotional proximity. Accordingly, there is a potential for emotional out-
bursts and high tension levels.
Family law mediation5" is designed "to settle separation and divorce-
related differences through agreement.' Mediation, unlike combative di-
vorce litigation, "helps family members resolve their disputes in an informa-
tive and consensual manner., 52 Divorce mediation promotes effective com-
munication, exploration of options, negotiation, and compromise, and "per-
mits divorcing couples to address and resolve their own problems as compe-
tent adults."53
4S. See id.
46 Id. at 107.
47 Id.
41 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 62.
49 See id.
so See generally ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 3, § 31:2.
51 Id.
52 Task Force on Mediation, Divorce and Family Mediation Standards of Practice,
1986 A.B.A. SEC. FAM. L. 1, 9.
S3 ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 3, § 31:2. Despite its empowering attributes,
mediation is not a replacement for therapy. See MARGARET M. FoT & ROBERT
GARRITY, MEDIATION AND COMMUNICATION SKILLS, A MANUAL FOR TRAINING 3
(1994). Instead, mediation is an enabling process that empowers parties to create their
1997]
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B. Current Statutory Landscape
The current statutory landscape ranges from permitting parties to enter
into mediation to mandating mediation. There are five broad categories of
statutes: (1) statutes in which a party may request to enter into mediation; 4
(2) statutes in which participation in mediation is a prerequisite to a judicial
hearing;55 (3) statutes permitting the court to order mediation;56 (4) stat-
utes that advise against or prohibit the use of mediation in cases involving
abuse or domestic violence;5 7 and (5) statutes that permit the use of media-
own solution.
14 See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060 (Michie 1996) (allowing parties to request media-
tion, or the court to order mediation "if it determines that mediation may result in a
more satisfactory settlement between the parties," although parties may withdraw and
the mediator may terminate, in which case "the divorce action shall proceed in the usual
manner"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:15-a (1992) (allowing the court to suspend pro-
ceedings if both parties wish to enter into mediation, unless it appears "to either the
court or the mediator, or when either party asserts that abuse ... has occurred").
51 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990) (repealed 1994); DEL.
FAM. CT. C.R. (16)(a)(1); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251(4) (West Supp. 1997)
("When agreement through mediation is not reached on an issue, the court must deter-
mine that the parties made a good faith effort to mediate the issue before proceeding
with a hearing."); WIS. STAT. § 767.11(5) (West Supp. 1997) ("[I]n any action affecting
the family ... the parties shall attend at least one session with a mediator ... [unless]
the court finds that attending the session will cause undue hardship or would endanger
the health or safety of one of the parties.").
56 See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-24-5 (West 1996) (stating that "the court shall deter-
mine whether the proceeding should be referred to mediation"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.052(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1995) ("[T]he court may order mediation only if the
court determines that it is in the best interests of the parties to order mediation and
makes specific written findings of fact to support its determination."); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 3901(b) (West Supp. 1997) ("The court may order the parties to attend an
orientation session to explain the mediation process. Thereafter, should the parties con-
sent to mediation, the court may order them to mediate such issues as it may specify.");
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-29 (1996) ("[A]s to issues of custody and visitation [the court
may] direct the parties to participate in mediation in an effort resolve their differenc-
es.").
17 See COLO. REV. ST. ANN. § 13-22-311 (West 1997) (requiring a party to claim
physical or psychological abuse to be exempt from mediation; otherwise, the court may
order mediation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 711A (Supp. 1996) (preventing mediation
if a court finds that one party committed domestic violence on the other party or if a
civil protection order is in effect); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.7A (West Supp. 1997) (stat-
ing that "the court shall determine ... whether the parties to the proceeding shall par-
ticipate in mediation to attempt to resolve differences" unless the court "determines that
a history of abuse exists"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(2)(b) (West Supp. 1998) (provid-
ing that the court may "refer to mediation all or any part of a filed civil action" unless
the court "finds there has been a history of domestic violence that would compromise
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tion when reasonable screening has occurred."
1. Mediation in Divorce Proceedings
Several issues arise in the context of divorce mediation: power balanc-
ing, family court conciliation versus private mediation, screening, and confi-
dentiality. These concepts must be explored briefly to determine whether
mandatory mediation in divorce disputes or mediation in cases of abuse
violate one or both participants' due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
the mediation process"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41.5(a) (Supp. 1996) (stating that in
"contested divorce proceedings where there are allegations of spousal abuse," a court
"shall not require a party alleging the spousal abuse to participate in any component of
any mediation program against the wishes of that party"); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
750/5-404 (West Supp. 1997) (permitting the court, if a party demonstrates good cause,
to "prohibit conciliation, mediation or other process that requires the parties to meet and
confer without counsel"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.13 (West 1996) (stating that "[i]n a
criminal action arising from domestic abuse ... the court shall not refer or order the
parties involved to mediation" until the criminal action is resolved); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.036 (Michie Supp. 1996) (stating that "if there is a finding of domestic
violence and abuse ... the court shall not order mediation" unless the victim requests
it, the court finds the victim's request voluntary, and mediation is a realistic and viable
alternative); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1997) (stating that
"[n]o court shall compel parties to mediate any aspect of their case" if the person suf-
fering from abuse has filed "a complaint in the court requesting protection from such
abuse"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619(2) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that in custody
or visitation cases, "[i]f the court determines that there is probable cause that one of the
parties, or a child of a party, has been physically or sexually abused by the other party,
the court shall not require ... mediation"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-301(2) (1995 &
Supp. 1997) (stating that mediation cannot continue if the court suspects physical, sexu-
al, or emotional abuse); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3.500.2(b) (Michie Supp. 1995) (stat-
ing that a showing of domestic violence history permits the court to exclude case from
mediation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4.6 (Supp. 1997) ("In any case brought under the
provisions of this chapter, the court may not order the parties into mediation for resolu-
tion of the issues in a petition for an order for protection.").
58 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3181(a) (West 1997) (permitting separate mediation once
a written declaration of domestic violence is filed); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 160) (allowing
the court discretionary power to order mediation unless inappropriate); TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 154.022 (West 1997) (requiring that the court find a reasonable
basis for an objection to mediation before the referral is prohibited); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-21 (1996) (repealed 1997) (establishing a pilot program that provides for man-
datory mediation in divorce regarding custody/visitation; court can direct parties to
mediation while issuing necessary protective orders); cf NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2904(2)
(Supp. 1996) (requiring training for mediators to enable them to recognize domestic
violence before parties begin mediation; implementing screening guidelines and safety
procedures).
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a. Power Balancing
Parties must have roughly equal bargaining power to effectively resolve
a divorce dispute through mediation. In fact, one of the requirements of
mediation is that the parties possess equivalent power.5 9 Parties' positions
are not necessarily balanced in divorce mediation; however, their "ability to
,participate equally in a negotiation" is crucial to a just outcome.'
In general, divorce mediators endeavor to balance the power between the
parties, which "tends to produce agreements that are more fair and volun-
tary, rather than coerced."61 The balancing is not intended to reduce a more
powerful position, but only to equalize the parties' ability to participate.62
If parties have roughly equal bargaining power, it is more likely that the
decision the parties reach will have lasting effect.63
b. Family Court Conciliation v. Private Mediation
Local tax revenues fund family court conciliation or any other type of
court-sponsored mediation.' A court can either refer parties to, or require
them to utilize, court-annexed mediation.
Private mediation can provide advantages not offered by court-ordered
mediation.65 For example, in private mediation all issues related to the di-
vorce can be mediated together. Unlike court officials, who are restricted in
what they can offer the parties," private mediators have the ability to be
creative in fashioning solutions.67 Private mediation may be more success-
ful because parties who pay for mediation may be more willing to compro-
mise." Finally, parties may be more forthcoming with their thoughts and
feelings with a private mediator than they would be with a court official.
" See Gagnon, supra note 1, at 274.
60 ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 3, § 31:5.
61 Id.
62 See id.
See Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 1, at 255.
See Milne & Folberg, supra note 40, at 12.
65 See ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 3, § 31:12.
6 See id.
67 See id.
See id.; see also id. § 24:5 ("The mediator's fee is usually hourly, ranging from
$125-600 per hour depending on experience and ability. It is usually split among the
parties so it is typically a small additional expense.").
286 [Vol. 6:1
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c. Screening
Screening processes are crucial in both court-sponsored and private me-
diation to determine the appropriateness of mediation in a given case.
Screening should be used to determine if domestic violence or abuse oc-
curred in the relationship. If domestic violence or abuse has occurred, the
mediation process is undermined, because one basic principle of media-
tion-that the parties have roughly equal bargaining power-is absent. If
equal bargaining power is not present, the mediation should not continue.69
The Mediation Center of Kentucky advised rejecting a case set for medi-
ation if one or more of the following conditions are present:
a. There have been two or more hitting incidents during the
last year or hitting incidents in the past, which cause the
victim to still be in fear-For the purposes of this policy,
hitting will also include: slapping, punching, kicking, biting,
or striking with objects or throwing objects at the person in
such a way as to put them in danger of injury.
b. There has been one incident where the victim has been
injured to the point of requiring medical attention within the
last year, or some incident in the past that causes the victim
to be in fear.
c. The spouse has made serious threats to injure the Victim
or has threatened to commit suicide within the past six
months.7"
If any of the above conditions exist, the mediator sends a memorandum to
both the court and the parties stating that the case is not acceptable for me-
diation. The mediator does not need to give any further explanation of the
rejection.7'
Standards like these are essential. It can be difficult, however, to imple-
ment them. One problem with implementing such standards is the education
and training of mediators. Mediators must be trained specifically for domes-
tic abuse cases.72 A mediator who is unskilled in recognizing domestic vio-
69 Many authors agree that, along with the other basic elements of mediation,
"equality or rough parity of bargaining power" is necessary for successful mediation.
Gagnon, supra note 1, at 274; see also Milne & Folberg, supra note 40, at 3-8.
' Gary W. Paquin, The Development and Organization of Domestic Relations Medi-
ation in a Multi-Function Mediation Center in Kentucky, 81 Ky. L.J. 1133, 1149
(1993).
71 See id.
n See Trigoboff, supra note 6, at 32.
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lence might proceed unknowingly with a case in which abuse has occurred.
A mediator must be able to recognize the signs of domestic abuse and to
know whether to terminate the process, or to continue while protecting the
interests of the disadvantaged party.73
d. Confidentiality
Mediation is a form of settlement negotiation in which confidentiality
plays an important role. To ensure complete disclosure of information,
parties must be assured that confidentiality will be protected in two ways:
"first, that what is disclosed during the private caucus sessions will not be
revealed to the opponent during the mediation, and second, that what tran-
spires during the mediation [will] not be disclosed in any Subsequent pro-
ceeding."75
Problems arise, however, in situations of abuse. Some states require
mediators to report family abuse.76 As a result, a statutory duty to report
would override the confidentiality a mediator normally guarantees. Not all
states, however, have this duty. Without a statutory duty to report or a stat-
ute exempting cases involving abuse from court-ordered mediation, in a
situation of abuse, a mediator may not be able to terminate the mediation or
legally breach confidentiality. As a result, an abused party may be forced
into court-ordered mediation by a statute that does not have an exemption
for abuse. Such a result places the abused in a tenuous position.
e. Situations of Abuse
Situations of abuse give rise to questions concerning whether mediation
is appropriate. The Domestic Abuse and Mediation Project provides an ex-
cellent framework within which to evaluate the usefulness and appropriate-
ness of mediation in situations of abuse.
The study, based on Maine's current Court Mediation Service, endeavors
to formulate procedures and policies for mediation.77 The project defined
Although many scholars agree that mediation should not continue when a situation
of abuse becomes evident to the mediator, some argue that mediation can still continue
and be successful. See Stephen Erickson & Marilyn McNight, Mediating Spousal Abuse
Divorces, 7 MEDIATION Q. 377, 378 (1990) (promoting the idea that "mediation ses-
sions with both spouses present can reduce the likelihood of future abuse"); Alison E.
Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screening for Domestic Abuse, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
43, 55-59 (1995) (stating that once screening has uncovered abuse, the mediation should
not continue); Linda K. Girdner, Mediation Triage: Screening for Spouse Abuse in
Divorce Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 365, 365-66 (1990) (agreeing that mediation
should not continue in situations of abuse).
74 See ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 3, § 27:1.
75 Id.
76 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12A (1996).
77 See MEDIATION IN CASES OF.DOMESTIC ABUSE, supra note 4. As the title sug-
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several terms, which are particularly useful in delineating what may be an
appropriate or inappropriate case for mediation. Domestic relations is de-
fined as "disputes over parental rights and responsibilities, child support,
parent/child contact, the division of marital property, and spousal support
(alimony)."' This deals with long-term, permanent arrangements for fami-
lies. Domestic abuse refers to "acts of intimidation, harassment, coercion,
and violence perpetrated by an abuser against a former or current intimate
partner.... Th[e] acts serve to maintain the abuser's power and control
over the abused person."'79 Non-physical acts "include, but are not limited
to, emotional abuse, isolation, threats and the use of male privilege.""
Physical acts "include, but are not limited to, pushing, shoving, choking,
slapping, hitting, using weapons, and physically detaining."'" These defi-
nitions help distinguish the often confusing terms used in abuse discus-
sions-"
One foundational principle of mediation is that parties entering into
mediation should have roughly equal bargaining power. Abuse affects that
power, which can be defined as:
the ability of each disputant to get what each wants, to stop
the other from getting what he/she wants or of obtaining
outcomes both want, regardless of the support or opposition
of the other .... The potential power of each disputant is a
function of the resources each party brings with them to
mediation."
A party's power can be affected in many ways. The Domestic Abuse
Intervention Project determined how power affects an abused person in her
bid for equal bargaining power.' The Project's "Power and Control
gests, the project that the Maine Court Mediation Service discusses addressed the use of
mediation in protection-from-abuse and domestic abuse cases. The overall question
posed was: Can mediation be a helpful option, or is it an unacceptable risk?
The project studied protection-from-abuse cases, which stem from judicial direc-
tives based on factual determinations that abuse occurred. The court orders issued in
such cases protect an abused from an abuser. This Note addresses the use of mediation
only in domestic abuse cases and subsequent divorce actions.
78 Id. at 6.
79 Id. at 5.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 7.
"' Barbara J. Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women
and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317, 319 (1990).
" This study, like the others noted, used feminine pronouns because of the over-
whelming percentage of abused women compared to abused men in the United States.
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Wheel"8 illustrates the means by which an abuser can exert power and
control over the abused. This control carries over into the mediation pro-
cess.8 6 Abuse can take many forms that may not fall within the traditional
notion of physical violence.
2. Mediation in Custody and Visitation Disputes
In many states that permit some form of mediation in divorce proceed-
ings, the laws inextricably tie mediation to proceedings involving custody or
visitation disputes.87 The policy underlying these statutes stems from the
The use of "she" or "her," however, should be read to encompass both men and women
who have been victims of abuse.
85 MEDIATION IN CASES OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, supra note 4, at 47 (utilized by the
Domestic Abuse Intervention Project).
86 See id. Types of power or control include:
Using Economic Abuse: [p]reventing her from getting or keeping a job; mak-
ing her ask for money; giving her an allowance; taking her money; not letting her
know about or have access to family income.
Using Male Privilege: [t]reating her like a servant; making all the big deci-
sions; acting like the "master of the castle"; being the one to define men's and
women's roles.
Using Children: [m]aking her feel guilty about the children; using the chil-
dren to relay messages; using visitation to harass her; threatening to take the chil-
dren away.
Minimizing, Denying and Blaming: [m]aking light of the abuse and not tak-
ing her concerns about it seriously; saying the abuse didn't happen; shifting re-
sponsibility for abusive behavior; saying she caused it.
Using Isolation: [c]ontrolling what she does, who she sees and talks to, what
she reads, where she goes; limiting her outside involvement; using jealousy to
justify actions.
Using Emotional Abuse: [p]utting her down; making her feel bad about her-
self; calling her names; making her think she's crazy; playing mind games; humil-
iating her; making her feel guilty.
Using Intimidation: [m]aking her afraid by using looks, actions, gestures;
smashing things; destroying her property; abusing pets; displaying weapons.
Using Coercion and Threats: [m]aking and/or carrying out threats to do some-
thing to hurt her; threatening to leave her, to commit suicide, to report her to
welfare; making her drop charges; making her do illegal things.
Id.
87 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-602 (1996) (permitting the court to order medi-
ation in custody and visitation issues); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.179, 107.765 (1996)
(providing for mediation when joint custody is disputed); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-4-56 (1996) (allowing the court to order mediation in any custody or visitation
dispute); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.4 (Michie 1996) (stating that "in assessing the ap-
propriateness of a referral, the court shall ascertain upon motion of party whether there
is a history of family abuse" in custody and visitation cases).
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adversarial nature of custody and visitation disputes and the negative impact
that such disputes can have on children."8 Because of the underlying
themes of mediation, the results achieved through mediation are much more
conducive to protecting children than is exposing them to a court battle.
Utah, for example, established a pilot program 9 that required courts to
refer domestic cases to mediation.9° The Utah statute, however, advised
against continuing the mediation in a situation of abuse. 9' The pertinent
portion of the statute states that:
[i]f it appears to the court on the face of the complaint or at
any time during the divorce proceedings prior to the entry of
the initial divorce decree that issues of custody or visitation
of a child or children are contested, the court shall refer the
matter for mediation of the contested issues prior to or con-
current with the setting of the matter for hearing.92
The statute had a specific provision for waiver of the mandatory mediation
requirement. Waiver could occur through several means, including objection
by a party or a finding that "attendance at a mediation session would cause
undue hardship to or threaten the mental or physical health or safety of
either of the parties or the child or children of the parties."93 By including
an escape hatch mechanism, the statute did not force a party who could be
harmed by mandatory mediation to proceed with the process.94
A Kansas statute also permits court-ordered mediation. Kansas permits a
court to "order mediation of any contested child custody issue or visitation
at any time, upon the motion of a party or on the court's own motion.
95
The statute does not provide for an escape from mediation. The statute in-
See generally Bruce Balto, Mediator Directiveness in Child Custody Mediation:
An Exploration of Alternatives and Decision Making, 7 MEDIATION Q. 215 (1990);
Maggie Vincent, Mandatory Mediation of Custody Disputes: Criticism, Legislation, and
Support, 20 VT. L. REV. 255 (1995) (discussing rationales for mandatory mediation, as
well as criticisms and remedial measures taken by legislators).
89 The pilot program was a mandatory mediation program that implemented divorce
mediation if the parties disputed custody or visitation. This program lasted from January
1, 1993, to March 1, 1995, in the fourth judicial district.
90 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-21 (1996) (repealed 1997).
"' See id. § 30-6-4.6 (1996) ("In any case brought under the provisions of this chap-
ter, the court may not order the parties into mediation for resolution of the issue in a
petition for an order for protection.").
Id. § 30-3-21(2) (1996) (repealed 1997).
93 Id.
' Cf Gagnon, supra note 1, at 274-82 (explaining the problems of mediation in
divorce cases).
95 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-602(a) (1995).
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stead focuses on the requirements for mediators in an effort to prevent the
introduction into the system of mediator bias or incompetence.
Statutes differ regarding the burden a party must overcome to convince
a court that mediation is not appropriate. The burdens range from a rela-
tively high burden, in which a party must convince the court of abuse,9 6 to
an exemption if either the mediator discovers or a party asserts family vio-
lence.97 These burdens deny a party her constitutional right to due process
in mandatory mediation situations."
III.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.'99
The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private deprivation of
individual rights. It applies only to state deprivation of individual rights."°°
If, however, a party can show state involvement, a court may find that a
party's constitutional rights were violated. State involvement is not an easy
burden to satisfy; the Fourteenth Amendment "can be violated only by con-
duct that may fairly be characterized as 'state action.""'1 "
To find state action, a court need not determine that the state was direct-
ly involved. The state may be a removed actor and still act to abridge a
party's due process rights." In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,0 3 the Su-
preme Court devised a two-part test to determine if state action occurred.
"First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privi-
lege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by
a person for whom the State is responsible."" Second, "the party charged
with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor."'0 5 A person can be a state actor if: (1) the person is "a state offi-
cial," (2) the person "has acted together with or has obtained significant aid
96 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311 (West. Supp. 1996) (requiring that the
party show physical or psychological abuse to be exempt from mediation).
9' See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-41.5(b) (Michie 1996).
9' See discussion infra Part III.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
o See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 799 (1966).
101 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).
102 See Kelly Rowe, The Limits of the Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic
Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY L.J. 855, 888 (1985).
103 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
1(4 Id. at 937.
105 Id.
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from state officials," or (3) the person's conduct is "otherwise chargeable to
the state."' '
Depending on the administration of and access to divorce mediation,
implementing the process can violate a party's due process rights. 7 The
first prong of the Lugar test, "the rule of conduct imposed by the state,"'"8
is key in assessing whether mediation violates a party's due process rights.
When parties voluntarily choose mediation there is no violation of due
process. Two private individuals seeking the help of a private mediator to
assist in the divorce context does not constitute any form of state action. A
case involving voluntary mediation would not even reach the threshold
question of state action because the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply
to the private deprivation of individual rights. A party engaged in voluntary
mediation is not likely to raise the issue that she was coerced into using this
particular form of dispute resolution. The state did not impose the media-
tion; rather, the couple freely chose it as an alternative to the adversarial
system. If a party is unhappy with the solution created in mediation, she
may decline to sign the mediation agreement and choose instead to pursue a
court-imposed solution.
In court-ordered mediation, however, the mediation occurs because a
magistrate or district judge requires a couple to mediate their differences,
such as in divorce, custody, and visitation."° A couple in this situation
goes to the court to resolve their divorce dispute, and the court makes a
determination, whether by statute or by discretion,"' to impose mediation
on the parties. Whether the magistrate or district judge's act is compulsory
or discretionary is irrelevant."' The issue is simply that the decision "is
106 Id.
107 One author addressed the due process argument with respect to battered women:
The due process argument which can be made on behalf of battered women in
regard to mediation is as follows: When battered women are ordered by the court
to go to the neighborhood justice center they are deprived of their liberty and
property in the form of a right of access to the court, a right to remain in their
home, and a right to personal security. In order to support this argument four
elements must be proven: 1) that there was state action; 2) that the battered wom-
an has a liberty or property right at stake; 3) that mediation deprives her of that
right; and 4) that the process which led to the deprivation of her right was not
adequate.
Rowe, supra note 102, at 887.
One main difference between battered women seeking protection from abuse and
women seeking divorces is that the women seeking divorces are attempting to procure a
legal right, while the women seeking protection from abuse are attempting to prevent
further violations of their rights.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
109 See discussion supra Part ll.B.
110 See discussion supra Part II.B.
. See Rowe, supra note 102, at 888.
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supported by the legal mechanism through which the rule of conduct is en-
forced.""..2 As a result, the state imposes the rule of conduct and thus ful-
fills the first prong of the test.
Under the second prong of the Lugar test, a party's allegation that she
was deprived of her due process rights must be supported by a finding that
the accused was a state actor."3 A magistrate or district judge who man-
dates mediation is a state actor-she is a member of the judicial branch
acting in the capacity of a state representative. Additionally, any person or
organization providing mandatory mediation services is considered to have
"obtained significant aid from state officials."".4 Those who provide court-
annexed mediation services, therefore, can be considered state actors.
Once the state action and state actor thresholds are met, the party assert-
ing a due process claim must show that the state action deprived her of her
due process rights."5 To prove such a deprivation, the party must show
that the state action deprived her of either a property or liberty interest."6
Proving deprivation of property is a difficult, if not impossible, burden
to carry because the marriage has not yet been dissolved. As a result, stand-
ing also might be problematic because a party may not be able to show
injury-in-fact." 7 An unfair proceeding in the form of mandatory mediation,
however, could, and in fact will, deprive a party of property. A divorce
112 Id.
1,3 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
114 Id.
"' See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 ("[T]he deprivation must be caused by the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.").
116 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. Due process includes life, liberty, and property. Id.
A claim of deprivation of life without due process of law cannot arise out of mediation
because mediation does not involve the type of state action to which due process re-
garding life is applicable.
117 See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990); Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S.
464, 471-472 (1982). If a party cannot show injury-in-fact, the analysis does not reach
the additional elements of whether the party was adversely affected and whether
redressibility is possible. A party must have a significant stake in the controversy to be
a party to the litigation and must show standing. The three elements of standing are the
following: (1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation by the challenged action, and (3)
redressibility. The most pertinent is the first element-the injury must be concrete and
particularized. A party in mediation may have reduced bargaining power, which may
affect the outcome of property or other asset division. The harm, however, is specula-
tive because it has not yet happened; the party, therefore, cannot fulfill the burden of a
concrete and particularized injury. Until an unfavorable outcome occurs, no injury ex-
ists. This puts the party in a Catch-22; constitutionally, she cannot meet the burden of
showing injury, but she also cannot prevent the potential injury if she is required to
mediate.
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decree includes a division of marital assets. If a party is not heard in an
adversarial proceeding and is forced to mediate instead, the party may be
deprived of her share of marital property if she does not possess roughly
equal bargaining power."' Such a deprivation of property as a result of
mandatory mediation is a violation of the party's due process rights.
The potential for the violation of a party's due process rights must be
considered in both mandatory mediation that does not involve abuse and
mandatory mediation in which an abusive situation exists (or existed) in the
relationship. When a court imposes mediation, unequal bargaining power
may affect the division of property."9 Unequal bargaining power most fre-
quently arises when abuse has occurred in the relationship.' A party may
be fearful of asserting her right to property because, as the "Power and
Control Wheel"'' suggests, the abuser may have exerted economic abuse,
coercion and threats, or intimidation. 22 At a mediation session an abused
party is unlikely to have the courage to assert her property interest. She may
fear for her physical safety or for her children's safety.
Proving a deprivation of liberty is the key to proving a deprivation of
due process. The Supreme Court held that in determining whether a "deci-
sion of the State implicates an interest within the protection of the Four-
teenth Amendment ... [and] whether due process requirements apply in the
first place, [the Court] must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the
interest at stake."' 23 The Court recognized that liberty included the right
"generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as es-
sential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."'' The nature of
that privilege in the context of mediation is the individual's right to choose
her forum for litigation-in sum, having access to the courts.
118 Admittedly, the party may not be satisfied with the division of property under the
adversarial process, but at a minimum, the party has chosen the means of dispute reso-
lution.
119 See Rowe, supra note 102, at 890-93.
'20 See MEDIATION IN CASES OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, supra note 4, at 29-31.
An abused person who displays characteristics such as the following may be un-
able to mediate: [flear that she will be harmed by the abuser[;] [flear of retribu-
tion if she does not make concessions or compromises[;] [e]xpressions of defeat-
ism and subjugation[;] [a]n unwillingness or inability to express her own interests,
needs, and wants as separate from his[; and] [a]n inclination to promote the
abuser's interests over her own.
Id. at 29-30.
121 Id. at 47.
'22 See id.
123 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1972) (citation omitted).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (citations omitted).
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A. Recent Case Law
Mandatory participation in ADR is an issue that some courts have con-
sidered. For example, according to two federal courts of appeal, it is beyond
the court's scope to require participation in the context of a summary jury
trial," although several lower courts have determined that a court may
issue participation orders in that type of proceeding." Some courts have
held that requiring parties to participate in less formal ADR proceedings,
such as mediation, is constitutional. 7
Although few cases discuss the mandatory use of mediation, the courts'
opinions are consistent. In Decker v. Lindsay,"s the litigants sought relief
against a judge who had ordered mediation in a personal injury suit. The
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code "expresses the general policy that
'peaceable resolution of disputes' is to be encouraged through 'voluntary
settlement procedures."" 9 The court determined that the Code section was
"consistent with a scheme where a court refers a dispute to an ADR proce-
dure, requiring the parties to come together in court-ordered ADR proce-
dures, but no one can compel the parties to negotiate or settle a dispute
unless they voluntarily and mutually agree to do so." 3' The court held
that the judge's order not only required the parties to negotiate, but also
required them to attempt to reach a settlement-which expressly contradict-
ed the statutory scheme.'
In Decker, the court articulated a standard that seems theoreticaliy use-
ful, but the standard is not practical in the context of divorce mediation
when abuse has occurred. The court stated that the Texas Code "contem-
plates mandatory referral only, not mandatory negotiation."'3 Although
this standard may be useful in certain types of mediation, such as commer-
125 See In re NLO Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1993); Strandell v. Jackson County,
838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987).
126 See, e.g., McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Arabi-
an Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
127 See Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Tex. App. 1992); Kurtz v.
Kurtz, 538 So. 2d 892, 894-95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
128 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App. 1992). The court upheld Decker in two additional
cases: Hansen v. Sullivan, 886 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App. 1994), and In re Marriage of
Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. App. 1993).
" Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 250 (citing TEx. Clv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.002 (Vernon Supp. 1992)).
130 Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
131 See id.
132 Id.
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cial or medical malpractice, the standard is not applicable to divorce and
custody mediation.133
The Texas Code enables the trial court to refer a dispute to ADR sua
sponte unless a party objects and there is a reasonable basis for the objec-
tion."M The corollary to this provision is "a court may refer the dispute to
an ADR procedure if it finds there is no reasonable basis for the objec-
tion."'35 Although the litigants in Decker objected to the order on constitu-
tional grounds of due process, the court dismissed the challenge as "without
argument or authorit[y].' 36
One of our protected historic liberties is the "right to be free from and
to obtain judicial relief, for unjustified intrusions on personal security."' 3
Certainly access to the courts is within this liberty interest. 138 Courts, how-
ever, have stated that mandatory mediation does not deny access to the
courts. As the District Court of Appeals of Florida in Kurtz v. Kurtz'
39
found, a referral to mediation does not deny a party her rights to be heard in
court; rather, it "merely defers ruling on [her] motion until after family
mediation."'4 ° In Kurtz, the court denied a husband's motion for contempt
and a visitation schedule and refused to hear it until the parties attempted
family mediation.14' The court stated that under Florida Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 1.740, the court is "expressly authorize[d] ... to refer parental re-
sponsibility issues to family mediators."'142 The court held that claims of
133 See id.
134 See TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
135 Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 250.
136 Id. at 251.
137 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
138 Several state constitutions contain a clause that guarantees access to the courts.
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 11; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; ILL. CONST.-art. 1, § 12;
IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights,
art. 19; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 11; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13;
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; Wis.
CONST. art. I, § 9.
139 538 So. 2d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see also Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.
2d 802, 807 (Fla. 1976) (stating that "it has never been a constitutional 'privilege' to
file a lawsuit in a judicial tribunal in the first instance").
140 Kurtz, 538 So. 2d at 894.
141 See id. at 893.
142 Id. at 894. Additionally, the court found that two Administrative Orders supported
its decision. One stated: "All domestic post-judgment matters involving custody or visi-
tation disputes shall be referred to the family mediation program prior to scheduling any
hearings before the judge to whom the matter is assigned." Id. (quoting Administrative
Order 2.03.15). The other stated: "As soon as it becomes apparent that the primary,
residence, custody or visitation will be contested, the parties shall apply to the presiding
judge for immediate referral to such matters for mediation .... The presiding judge
may make such referral at any time on the court's own motion." Id. (quoting Adminis-
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constitutional due process violations were without merit because the party,
at most, "will suffer a temporary delay of court proceedings in the interest
of a mediated settlement." '143 The court also found that "[m]ediation is not
a binding court proceeding. If it is unsuccessful, the parties return to court
for further proceedings. This distinguishes the process from matters involv-
ing general or special matters, in which nonjudicial officers make findings
of fact, conclusions of law and recommended dispositions."'"
In another jurisdiction, the court did not permit a delay of court proceed-
ings. In Department of Transportation v. City of Atlanta,'45 the Supreme
Court of Georgia agreed with the Texas Court of Appeals in Decker "that
parties may not be ordered to settle their dispute." '46 The court recognized
that an important benefit of mediation is the breaking of a standstill in nego-
tiations.147 Unlike the District Court of Appeals in Kurtz, however, the
court assured litigants access to the courts by holding that referrals to medi-
ation "shall be done in a way not to interfere with nor delay the right of the
parties to litigate the issues."'48
The most recent case regarding mandatory mediation fits the context
discussed earlier: a situation in which abuse occurred in a marriage.'49 In
In re Mechtel,'5" the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed whether "the
issuance of an ex parte order should also be treated as an implicit finding of
probable cause of physical abuse."'' The applicable statute states that if
the court determines there is probable cause that abuse occurred, "the court
shall not require or refer the parties to mediation or any other process that
requires the parties to meet and confer without counsel."' The policy un-
derlying the rule, as the court affirmed, was that "a victim should not be
required to go through mediation with an abusive spouse."' 53 The court
found that the wife was improperly required to participate in mediation. 54
As the preceding cases indicate, courts find ways to uphold the constitu-
tionality of mandatory mediation without applying the due process test. One
trative Order 2.03.16).
143 id.
14I Id. at 894-95.
145 380 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 1989).
146 id. at 267.
147 See id.
141 Id. The court stated that "[i]f the trial court does refer the parties to mediation,
and either party determines that none of the issues can be resolved by mediation, litiga-
tion will proceed according to the schedule set by the trial court." Id. at 268.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 77-86.
-- 528 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. App. 1995).
151 Id. at 919.
152 Id. at 918 (citing MINN. STAT. § 518.619 (1992)).
113 Id. at 919.
"' See id.
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reason for this approach may be that by issuing a decision that does not
entail a due process analysis, the courts are attempting to assist the party,
because the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving its un-
constitutionality. This is a tough burden to sustain. More than likely, howev-
er, the reason is the courts' unwillingness to find that access to the courts is
a fundamental right deserving of heightened scrutiny.'55
Courts must reassess their approach to divorce mediation because unique
issues arise in this form of ADR. For example, personal security in manda-
tory mediation is most crucial when the relationship includes abuse. Person-
al security can encompass emotional, economic, physical, and familial as-
pects. For example, an abused party may feel her personal security is com-
promised if the abuser makes her feel guilty for the abuse, prevents her
from having access to the family income, destroys property, hits her, threat-
ens to take the children away or uses visitation to harass her.'56 The very
process of mediation places an abused in confrontation with the abuser. If a
mediator does not discover abuse through a screening mechanism, 57 then
the legal system has imposed a duty upon the abused to attain legal help in
a manner that may be detrimental to both the abused party and the outcome.
The Washington Supreme Court attempted to protect parties from being
forced into dispute resolution mechanisms they do not choose. In Carter v.
University of Washington,'58 although later overruled, the court held that a
provision of the Washington state constitution guaranteed access to the
courts and thereby made the right fundamental. The state statute limiting
action, therefore, was subject to the strict scrutiny test, regardless of the
underlying substantive right asserted.'59 The importance of the court's
holding is paramount. If other courts reevaluate Carter and recognize that a
provision in a state constitution creates a fundamental right, courts can make
it more difficult for mandatory mediation legislation to survive constitutional
scrutiny. If access to the courts is deemed fundamental, a state must meet
the heavier burden of strict scrutiny to maintain mandatory mediation legis-
lation. If access to the courts is not deemed fundamental, then a state can
easily satisfy the rational relation test. The court in Carter reached the right
155 See Martin M. Loring, Note, Constitutional Law: Statutorily Required Mediation
as a Precondition to Lawsuit Denies Access to the Courts, 45 MO. L. REV. 316, 321
(1980) ("While most state constitutions specifically guarantee the right of access to the
courts, the United States Constitution does not. Thus, the ... argument that access to
the courts is a fundamental right in and of itself is not as readily available to the United
States Supreme Court.") (footnotes omitted).
156 Such tactics of the abuser are part of the "Power and Control Wheel." See supra
note 86.
157 See supra Part II.B.1.c.
158 536 P.2d 618 (Wash. 1975), overruled by Housing Auth. of King County v.
Saylors, 557 P.2d 321 (Wash. 1976).
'9 See id. at 623.
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decision. Other courts must reassess constitutional provisions regarding
access to the courts and how mandatory mediation legislation impedes a
party's right to resolve a dispute in the manner of her choosing.
Proponents of mediation claim that its use, especially in family disputes,
decreases the size of the court docket and reduces costs in the judicial sys-
tem."6 They claim that mediation provides lasting solutions to long-term
problems,'61 especially because many divorces involve custody and visita-
tion disputes, which require long-term solutions. The dissolution of a mar-
riage does not end the contact parties have with one another if children are
involved. The effectiveness of mediation, with its goal of producing an
agreement with which both parties will comply, necessarily does not end
when the parties sign the mediation agreement.
In Boddie v. Connecticut,62 the Supreme Court held that the allocation
of scarce resources was an insufficient state interest to justify denying citi-
zens access to the courts.'63 Mandatory mediation denies access to the
court system in the purest sense: a statutory or judicial determination that
mediation must be conducted denies access to the courts. As the Court
found in Boddie, the process at issue was so burdensome that it tended to
place an individual's exercise of due process rights beyond the individual's
reach."6
A fundamental question in due process analysis revolves around the
degree of process to which a party is entitled. In Ingraham v. Wright,65
the Court identified a balancing test to judge "whether a procedure consti-
tutes due process in [a] particular context."'" The factors include: "[f]irst,
the private interest that will be affected ... ; second, the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation of such an interest ... and, finally, the state interest.
'
,
67
The private interest of the party is paramount to determining whether a
procedure constitutes due process. Mediation presupposes that a roughly
equivalent power balance exists between the parties. Mandatory mediation in
a situation of domestic violence or abuse, however, does not have this
equality. This unequal bargaining power diminishes the abused party's abili-
ty to defend her liberty and property interests, and thus creates an atmo-
sphere that severely favors the state and the abuser. 16
'6 See Gerencser, supra note 73, at 49.
161 See id.
162 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
163 See id. at 381.
164 See id.; Rowe, supra note 102, at 892 (referring to the payment of court filing
fees to initiate divorce proceedings).
16 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
166 Rowe, supra note 102, at 894 (citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 675).
167 Id.
168 See supra text accompanying notes 116-22.
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The effect of a due process violation can be disastrous in situations of
divorce and domestic violence. The inability of the abused to "have her day
in court" based on a statute or judge's discretion denies her the formality of
the adversarial proceeding and all the rules that ensure a fair and impartial
hearing (and ideally, a fair outcome). Mediation, in contrast, is what the
parties make it. A party with greater bargaining power, therefore, can get
more out of mediation than he might obtain in court. 69 Such an imbalance
denies the party with less power the ability to achieve a result as preferable
as one that may stem from an adversarial proceeding.
The state interest in requiring mediation is weak. As discussed earlier,
the Supreme Court refused to recognize the "allocation of scarce resources"
as a sufficient reason for denying citizens access to the courts. 7 Other
potential state interests include: reducing a backlogged docket, promoting
long-term relationships between parties (which is a goal of mediation), and
leaving the parties to work out the details of what is ostensibly within the
penumbra of the First Amendment and the right to privacy.'7' A party's
right to due process may outweigh those interests.
Balancing the three factors devised in Ingraham,'72 a court reviewing
the constitutionality of mandatory mediation probably will look in which
group of statutes a specific provision at issue is located. The outcome of a
due process analysis will depend upon the particular statute analyzed. In
other words, whether a statute violates a party's due process rights depends
upon the nature of the statute itself.
B. Statutes Permitting Party-Recommended Mediation
New Hampshire has a provision in its statutes entitled "Voluntary Mari-
tal Mediation.' ' 173 The pertinent part of it states that "the court shall sus-
pend proceedings if both parties state that voluntary marital mediation will
be attempted in order to reach a mutually agreeable arrangement."'74 Sim-
ply put, this marital mediation is a voluntary action, requiring consent by
both parties, to resolve their differences outside of an adversarial proceed-
ing. No due process violation can exist because of the voluntariness of the
parties' actions. Under the Lugar test, no state action occurs. The "rule of
169 See discussion supra Part I.A.
170 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971).
1 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (upholding a couple's
right to privacy within their marital bedroom).
172 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977); supra note 167 and accompanying text.
'73 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:15-a (1995); see also supra note 54 (listing similar
statutory provisions in other states).
174 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:15-a (1995).
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conduct" is self-imposed, not state-imposed.175
The New Hampshire statute comports with the goals of mediation by
keeping the process voluntary. The voluntary aspect allows a party to de-
termine which dispute resolution process-adversarial or ADR-works best
for that party. By permitting choice, an individual can exercise her option to
pursue mediation or to access the courts.
C. Statutes Requiring Mediation as a Prerequisite to a Judicial Hearing
In Maine, the legislature passed a statute that empowers the court to
"refer the parties to mediation on any issue."' 76 This power is not unlike
powers other state legislatures have given their courts. The Maine legisla-
ture, however, went one step further. If the parties do not reach an
agreement through mediation, "the court must determine that the parties
made a good faith effort to mediate the issue before proceeding with a hear-
ing."177 If the court makes a finding that the parties did not make a good
faith effort to mediate, "the court may order the parties to submit to media-
tion, may dismiss the action or a part of the action, may render a decision
or judgment by default, may assess attorney's fees and costs or may impose
any other sanction that is appropriate in the circumstances." 78
The Maine statute is problematic, both in accomplishing the goals of
mediation and comporting with due process. First, if the courts impose the
process the parties are less likely to attain the goals of mediation because
the parties' participation is not voluntary-one of the major premises of
mediation. Second, the statute interferes with due process. Under the Lugar
test, state action occurs when the court mandates mediation because the state
imposes a rule of conduct that may cause a deprivation, and the judge may
be charged as a state actor.'79 Once the court determines that state action
has occurred, a court may use the balancing test devised in Ingraham to
determine whether the mandatory mediation constitutes due process in that
particular context. 8 ° The private interest each party holds is the right to
access the courts. In jurisdictions in which the state constitution guarantees
access to the courts,' the party has a right to access the courts, regardless
of whether the courts construe this right as fundamental. A party's right to
'7' Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
176 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251(1) (West Supp. 1997); see also supra note
55 (listing other statutes requiring mediation as a prerequisite to a judicial hearing).
.77 Id. § 251(4).
178 Id.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 103-14.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 165-72 (discussing the Ingraham test).
181 See supra note 138.
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access the courts, and the deprivation thereof, must be balanced against the
state's interests.
The risk of depriving a person of the right to pursue a judicial decision
is great. An abused party may mediate and reach a decision in an effort to
avoid further confrontation with the abuser, especially if a judge returned
the parties to mediation for failure to mediate in good faith. The state's
interest in requiring mediation is most likely one of alleviating the pressure
on its docket by encouraging the parties to devise their own solution
through mediation.'82 In Bennett v. Bennett,'83 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine took the first step toward preventing the deprivation of
parties' due process rights by not forcing the parties to mediate an agree-
ment. By preserving the opportunity for the court to resolve the dispute by
order, the court maintained a party's opportunity to choose as her forum
either the mediation table or the courtroom. The court, however, did not
take the second step of determining that the statute should not impose medi-
ation.
Imposing mediation and requiring the parties to mediate in good faith
ignores the possibility that a party may not be able to mediate at all, or even
to mediate in good faith. If an abused party is required to mediate, the party
is at a disadvantage,"s4 and the mediator may not be able to correct the re-
sulting power imbalance. A statute like Maine's does not take abuse cases
into account when empowering the courts to refer parties to mediation "in
any case under this Title [mediation]."' 5 As the Power and Control
Wheel 6 suggests, an abusive spouse uses several measures to exert power
and exercise control over the abused spouse. By referring to mediation a
divorce case in which abuse occurred, the court is licensing a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism in which the scales of bargaining power are tipped decided-
ly in the abuser's favor. Certainly the state's interests in decreasing the size
of its docket and encouraging parties to settle disputes on their own does
not outweigh the abused party's right to seek the perceived safety of court
proceedings in which the abused does not have to confront or negotiate with
the abuser. Additionally, the court's power to sanction parties or take other
actions, such as resubmitting the parties to mediation, truly denies a party
her right to pursue the dispute through traditional adversarial measures. An
abused party may agree to a mediated decision in an effort to not have to
repeat the resolution process either in mediation or in court. The power an
182 See Gerencser, supra note 73, at 49.
18 587 A.2d 463 (Me. 1991) (holding that in a divorce action, a wife could not be
compelled to sign an alleged mediation agreement because the mediation process is to
encourage, not force, parties to settle issues without the court's intervention).
1 See discussion supra Part II.B.l.e.
18 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251(1) (West Supp. 1997).
186 See supra note 86.
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abuser wields over the abused is significant.'87 An abused party may not
be willing to resubmit continually to that power and thus may agree to a
mediated agreement in lieu of pursuing a court decision. In this type of
situation, a statute that mandates mediation as a prerequisite to a judicial
hearing effectively denies, not delays, a party's access to the court.
D. Statutes Permitting Court-Ordered Mediation
Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island have statutes involving the court's
discretionary power to involve mediation in divorce actions.'88 Under the
Pennsylvania statute, a court may establish mediation for divorce or custody
actions.8 9 If the court establishes such a program, "the court may order
the parties to attend an orientation session to explain the mediation pro-
cess."'90 One crucial difference exists between this statute and the Maine
statute 9 -Pennsylvania courts may not order mediation beyond the initial
orientation session, whereas the Maine courts can impose a good faith at-
tempt at mediation as a prerequisite to a judicial hearing.' By giving par-
ties either the option to choose mediation or to proceed with the dispute in
court (the forum originally chosen), the Pennsylvania legislature permits the
parties access to the courts. In Pennsylvania, the state constitution guaran-
tees access to the courts.'93 Unlike the Maine legislature, which permits a
judge's order of good-faith mediation to have the effect (even if unintended)
of stripping parties of their right to obtain judicial relief,' the Pennsylva-
nia legislature has not stripped parties of their right to pursue justice in
court.
When parties have the option either to pursue or to decline the invitation
to mediate once they attend the orientation session, no due process violation
exists because mediation is implemented in its intended manner: voluntarily.
The state forces neither mediation nor litigation upon either party. This
187 See supra note 86.
188 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3901 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-29 (1996); see
also supra note 56.
189 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3901(a) (1996).
I9 d. § 3901(b).
191 See discussion supra Part III.C.
192 Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3901(b) (1996) (stating that "should the par-
ties consent to mediation, the court may order them to mediate such issues as it may
specify"), with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251(1), 251(3) (West Supp. 1997):
The court may, in any case under this Title, at any time refer the parties to medi-
ation on any issues .... When agreement through mediation is not reached on an
issue, the court must determine that the parties made a good faith effort to medi-
ate the issue before proceeding with a hearing.
193 See PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 184-87.
[Vol. 6:1
TEARING DOWN THE HOUSE
statute achieves the same result as the New Hampshire statute.195
The result under the Maine statute is similar to the result reached under
the Rhode Island statute, 96 which provides that the court may, in any di-
vorce petition involving custody or visitation, "direct the parties to partici-
pate in mediation in an effort to resolve their differences, [and] ... may
order the participation in mediation in a program established by the
court."'197 The Rhode Island legislature, while not mandating mediation as
a prerequisite to a judicial hearing, vests the judicial branch with the power
to determine a party's right of access to the courts.
Similar to the Maine legislature, by shifting the choice to the judicial
branch, the Rhode Island legislature denies a party her right to seek redress
in the forum of her choice. The Rhode Island statute, however, does not bar
the party to the same degree. It does not impose upon the parties a burden
to mediate in good faith. Instead, the court has three options:
(1) Order mediation under this section prior to trial and
postpone trial of the case pending the outcome of the media-
tion... ;
(2) Order mediation under this section prior to trial and
proceed to try the case as to issues other than custody and
visitation while the parties are at the same time engaged in
the mediation... ;
(3) Complete the trial of the case on all issues and order
mediation under this section upon the conclusion of the trial,
postponing entry of the decree pending outcome of the medi-
ation. 98
These options still restrict a party's right to due process, although not to the
same extent as does the Maine statute. The Maine statute acts as a bar to a
judicial proceeding unless the parties show that in good faith they attempted
mediation, but the mediation nonetheless failed. In contrast, the Rhode Is-
land statute provides the judge with options regarding how she may exercise
her authority to order mediation. The Rhode Island statute, however, may
still result in the denial of due process regardless of the degree. Under the
Ingraham test, 99 the affected private interest is a party's ability to pursue
redress in the courts. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of a party's due
process rights is the risk that an abused party will be forced to mediate,
agree to a solution obtained under unequal bargaining power, and thereby
195 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:15-a (1989).
196 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-29 (1996).
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See supra notes 165-67.
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forego the opportunity to have her day in court. Although mediation can be
an empowering process,2' divorce is a highly contentious issue. The par-
ties often seek closure. Forcing the parties to mediate may encourage them
to settle a dispute in a forum they otherwise would not have chosen. When
balancing the parties' interests against the state's interest of reducing the
size of the docket, it appears the scales should tip in favor of the party who
sought to resolve her problem in court. A substitute method-mandatory
mediation-is unacceptable in this situation because the state's interest does
not outweigh that of the individual.
E. Statutes Advising Against or Prohibiting Mediation When Abuse or
Domestic Violence Has Occurred
State legislatures are aware of the problem of mediating when abuse has
occurred. As a result, several states have enacted legislation prohibiting
mediation when abuse has occurred."°' Three jurisdictions in particu-
lar--Colorado,'2 Florida, 3 and Hawaii"--have drafted statutes that
exempt abused parties from mandatory mediation.
Colorado and Hawaii have lower standards for exemption. In Colorado,
the court shall not refer the case to mediation services or
dispute resolution programs where one of the parties claims
that she has been the victim of physical or psychological
abuse by the other party and states that she is thereby un-
willing to enter into mediation services or dispute resolution
programs. 5
Hawaii provides a similar means of obtaining exemption, stating that "where
there are allegations of spousal abuse, the court shall not require a party
alleging the spousal abuse to participate in any component of any mediation
program against the wishes of that party."'
Both statutory provisions protect an abused party from being strong-
armed into resolving her dispute in a manner inconsistent with her wishes.
The party has the option to remove herself from any mediation proceeding
simply by "alleging" or "claiming" abuse. This is a simple showing that
permits an abused party to gain relief.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
201 See supra notes 57-58.
202 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311 (West 1996).
ml FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(2)(b) (West 1997).
204 HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41.5 (1996).
20- COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311(1) (West 1996).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41.5 (1996).
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Although it too provides relief, the Florida statute imposes a stricter
burden on a party wishing to receive an exemption from mandatory media-
tion. In Florida, a court: "[m]ay refer to mediation all or any part of a filed
civil action . . . . A court shall not refer any case to mediation if it finds
there has been a significant history of domestic abuse that would compro-
mise the mediation process."2' That the court must make a finding infers
that a party must overcome a stricter burden to receive exemption from
mediation. Unlike the Colorado or Hawaii statutes that require only that an
abused party make a claim or allegation of abuse, the Florida statute shifts
the ultimate decision to the court by allowing the court to decide whether
the parties' circumstances meet the requirements of the statutory exemption.
Florida's requirement of a "significant history" of domestic abuse also is a
greater burden than the burdens imposed by the Colorado and Hawaii stat-
utes.
In all three statutes, the legislatures appear to preserve the right of an
abused party not to be forced into mediation, a situation in which an un-
equal power balance results when abuse has occurred. By permitting an
abused party an exemption, her due process rights remain intact.m In the
eyes of these three legislatures, under Ingraham an abused's rights and the
danger of deprivation apparently outweigh a state's interest in reducing the
size of the docket.
IV.
Mediation should always be a voluntary process, as its several defini-
tions suggest.' When parties voluntarily enter into mediation, constitu-
tional concerns do not arise. Systemic concerns, however, do surface. Medi-
ation presupposes roughly equal bargaining power and a non-binding pro-
cess. Mediators must be well-trained to ensure that the basic principles upon
which the foundation of mediation is built are met. ° In traditional litiga-
tion, a court can impose a judgment on a party based on the norms of the
2 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(2)(a), (b) (West 1997).
' These statutes, however, address exemptions only for parties who "allegedly"
have suffered abuse. A party who does not wish to mediate must still do so if mediation
was court-ordered and the party has not suffered abuse. A cynic might argue that a
prudent party should "claim" or "allege" abuse under the Colorado or Hawaii statutes to
secure an exemption from the court order if the party does not want to mediate. Nota-
bly, though, such a party would have a more difficult time under the Florida statute,
which requires the court to make a finding that the abuse occurred. Although this dis-
tinction between abused and non-abused parties may constitute a deprivation of the non-
abused's due process right to access the courts, it is beyond the scope of this Note to
further explore this matter.
' See discussion supra Part I.A.
210 See supra text accompanying note 12.
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court's experience. In mediation, the parties devise their own outcome. The
resulting agreement is even more powerful when the parties freely choose to
be bound by it.
When courts or statutes impose mediation, they strip mediation of a
crucial element: voluntary participation. As a result, the outcome of the
mediation is imposed to the same degree as an adjudicated outcome. The
outcome is simply imposed in a different forum. To retain the crucial ele-
ment of voluntariness, the furthest courts or statutes should go is to suggest
mediation to resolve issues in a divorce proceeding. If a court imposes me-
diation, due process concerns arise because a party's liberty interest is im-
peded. By providing court-annexed mediation, the court makes an attempt to
offer parties a potentially more satisfactory means of resolving their dispute
without intruding upon the parties' due process rights. If the parties are
willing, courts can and should provide for court-annexed mediation services
to assist the parties in the divorce proceeding. Voluntary court-annexed
mediation may reduce both the size of dockets and costs, as well as expedite
divorce proceedings.
State legislatures should repeal mandatory mediation statutes and statutes
that grant courts discretionary powers regarding mediation, because of the
constitutional issues mandatory mediation raises. When a party's right to a
trial is taken away, the party's right to due process is violated. To avoid
potential constitutional violations, courts and statutes should take the ap-
proach of informing the parties of their right to mediate without mandating
that option.
The courts' and statutes' responsibilities may not end with a non-manda-
tory referral to mediation. Screening procedures must be erected to ensure
that parties' rights are not violated if a proceeding goes to court-annexed
mediation. If a relationship contains some domestic violence or abuse, a
court-annexed mediation program may fall within the "state actor" category
and may result in the deprivation of a party's due process rights. If a partic-
ular mediation program fails the.Lugar test, the court may be violating a
party's due process interests, albeit unwittingly.
CONCLUSION
Voluntary participation, roughly equal bargaining power, and a non-
binding outcome are the cornerstones of the foundation of mediation. Medi-
ation provides many benefits for parties who choose to avail themselves of
the advantages. These benefits, however, are not automatic. If legislatures or
courts misuse mediation by making it mandatory, it ceases to be a useful
tool. In fact, when courts or legislatures impose mediation on parties who
want to resolve their dispute in court, mediation can become a bar to the
enjoyment of the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Mediation can be useful for many reasons. It creates win-win situations,
reconciles interests of parties, creates a better atmosphere for further negoti-
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ating and developing options for mutual gain, fosters an opportunity for a
continuing relationship, empowers the parties, and is more cost-effective
than traditional litigation. These options can be attractive to parties who
voluntarily choose this method of dispute resolution.
Not all parties have the choice between mediation and traditional ad-
versarial justice. Currently, legislation spans the spectrum from simply pro-
viding mediation services to mandating mediation without exception. Man-
datory mediation runs the danger of violating parties' due process rights
because it prevents parties from enjoying their rights to liberty and property
guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. Although a party's property inter-
est might be difficult to establish, the liberty interest a party can assert pass-
es the Supreme Court's current test regarding due process.
To ensure that statutes and courts do not run afoul of the fundamental
right to due process, mediation can never be mandatory. It must always be
voluntary---otherwise, it is a contradiction in terms. The very premise of
mediation is its voluntary nature, which in theory makes the parties more
willing to reach an agreement. The traditional adversarial system, with its
mandate that parties choose a position and stick to it, is not necessarily
conducive to reaching an agreement in divorce disputes, particularly those in
which custody and visitation are at issue. Mediation is an excellent option
when it is truly an option. When a court or statute mandates mediation,
however, a cornerstone of its foundation is removed, causing serious struc-
tural flaws.
COLLEEN N. KOTYK
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